
# **Chapter 14: Protection**





### **Chapter 14: Protection**

- Goals of Protection
- Principles of Protection
- Domain of Protection
- Access Matrix
- Implementation of Access Matrix
- Access Control
- Revocation of Access Rights
- Capability-Based Systems
- Language-Based Protection





- Discuss the goals and principles of protection in a modern computer system
- Explain how protection domains combined with an access matrix are used to specify the resources a process may access
- Examine capability and language-based protection systems





- In one protection model, computer consists of a collection of objects, hardware or software
- Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations
- Protection problem ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so





- Guiding principle principle of least privilege
  - Programs, users and systems should be given just enough privileges to perform their tasks
  - Limits damage if entity has a bug, gets abused
  - Can be static (during life of system, during life of process)
  - Or dynamic (changed by process as needed) domain switching, privilege escalation
  - "Need to know" a similar concept regarding access to data





## **Principles of Protection (Cont.)**


- Must consider "grain" aspect
  - Rough-grained privilege management easier, simpler, but least privilege now done in large chunks
    - For example, traditional Unix processes either have abilities of the associated user, or of root
  - Fine-grained management more complex, more overhead, but more protective
    - File ACL lists, RBAC
- Domain can be user, process, procedure





### **Domain Structure**

- Access-right = <object-name, rights-set> where rights-set is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object
- Domain = set of access-rights







## **Domain Implementation (UNIX)**


- Domain = user-id
- Domain switch accomplished via file system
  - Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit)
  - When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed
  - When execution completes user-id is reset
- Domain switch accomplished via passwords
  - su command temporarily switches to another user's domain when other domain's password provided
- Domain switching via commands
  - sudo command prefix executes specified command in another domain (if original domain has privilege or password given)





## **Domain Implementation (MULTICS)**

- Let D<sub>i</sub> and D<sub>j</sub> be any two domain rings
- If  $j < I \Rightarrow D_i \subseteq D_j$







### **Multics Benefits and Limits**

- Ring / hierarchical structure provided more than the basic kernel / user or root / normal user design
- Fairly complex -> more overhead
- But does not allow strict need-to-know
  - Object accessible in D<sub>i</sub> but not in D<sub>i</sub>, then j must be < i</li>
  - But then every segment accessible in D<sub>i</sub> also accessible in D<sub>i</sub>





- View protection as a matrix (access matrix)
- Rows represent domains
- Columns represent objects
- Access(i, j) is the set of operations that a process executing in Domain<sub>i</sub> can invoke on Object<sub>i</sub>

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	$F_3$	printer
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	read		read	
D <sub>2</sub>				print
<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>		read	execute	
<i>D</i> <sub>4</sub>	read write		read write	





### **Use of Access Matrix**

- If a process in Domain D<sub>i</sub> tries to do "op" on object O<sub>j</sub>, then "op" must be in the access matrix
- User who creates object can define access column for that object
- Can be expanded to dynamic protection
  - Operations to add, delete access rights
  - Special access rights:
    - owner of  $O_i$
    - copy op from  $O_i$  to  $O_j$  (denoted by "\*")
    - control  $D_i$  can modify  $D_j$  access rights
    - transfer switch from domain  $D_i$  to  $D_i$
  - Copy and Owner applicable to an object
  - Control applicable to domain object





### **Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)**

- Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy
  - Mechanism
    - Operating system provides access-matrix + rules
    - If ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced
  - Policy
    - User dictates policy
    - Who can access what object and in what mode
- But doesn't solve the general confinement problem





### **Access Matrix of Figure A with Domains as Objects**

object domain	<i>F</i> <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>	laser printer	<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	<b>D</b> <sub>2</sub>	<b>D</b> <sub>3</sub>	<b>D</b> <sub>4</sub>
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	read		read			switch		
<b>D</b> <sub>2</sub>				print			switch	switch
<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>		read	execute				С. 	
<i>D</i> <sub>4</sub>	read write		read write		switch			





### Access Matrix with Copy Rights

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	$F_2$	F <sub>3</sub>
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	execute		write*
D <sub>2</sub>	execute	read*	execute
<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>	execute		

(a)

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	$F_2$	F <sub>3</sub>
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	execute		write*
<i>D</i> <sub>2</sub>	execute	read*	execute
<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>	execute	read	

(b)



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### **Access Matrix With Owner Rights**

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	owner execute		write
<b>D</b> <sub>2</sub>		read* owner	read* owner write
<b>D</b> <sub>3</sub>	execute		

(a)

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	<b>F</b> <sub>2</sub>	$F_3$
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	owner execute		write
$D_2$		owner read* write*	read* owner write
D <sub>3</sub>		write	write

(b)



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### **Modified Access Matrix of Figure B**

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>	laser printer	<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	D <sub>2</sub>	<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>D</i> <sub>4</sub>
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	read		read			switch		
D <sub>2</sub>				print			switch	switch control
<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>		read	execute					
$D_4$	write		write		switch			





- Generally, a sparse matrix
- Option 1 Global table
  - Store ordered triples <domain, object, rights-set> in table
  - A requested operation M on object O<sub>j</sub> within domain D<sub>i</sub> -> search table for < D<sub>i</sub>, O<sub>j</sub>, R<sub>k</sub> >
    - $\blacktriangleright \text{ with } M \in R_k$
  - But table could be large -> won't fit in main memory
  - Difficult to group objects (consider an object that all domains can read)





- Option 2 Access lists for objects
  - Each column implemented as an access list for one object
  - Resulting per-object list consists of ordered pairs
    <domain, rights-set> defining all domains with non-empty set of access rights for the object
  - Easily extended to contain default set -> If M ∈ default set, also allow access





Each column = Access-control list for one object Defines who can perform what operation

> Domain 1 = Read, Write Domain 2 = Read Domain 3 = Read

 Each Row = Capability List (like a key) For each domain, what operations allowed on what objects
 Object F1 – Read
 Object F4 – Read, Write, Execute
 Object F5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy





- Option 3 Capability list for domains
  - Instead of object-based, list is domain based
  - Capability list for domain is list of objects together with operations allows on them
  - Object represented by its name or address, called a capability
  - Execute operation M on object O<sub>j</sub>, process requests operation and specifies capability as parameter
    - Possession of capability means access is allowed
  - Capability list associated with domain but never directly accessible by domain
    - Rather, protected object, maintained by OS and accessed indirectly
    - Like a "secure pointer"
    - Idea can be extended up to applications



# Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- Option 4 Lock-key
  - Compromise between access lists and capability lists
  - Each object has list of unique bit patterns, called locks
  - Each domain as list of unique bit patterns called keys
  - Process in a domain can only access object if domain has key that matches one of the locks





- Many trade-offs to consider
  - Global table is simple, but can be large
  - Access lists correspond to needs of users
    - Determining set of access rights for domain nonlocalized so difficult
    - Every access to an object must be checked
      - Many objects and access rights -> slow
  - Capability lists useful for localizing information for a given process
    - But revocation capabilities can be inefficient
  - Lock-key effective and flexible, keys can be passed freely from domain to domain, easy revocation






- Most systems use combination of access lists and capabilities
  - First access to an object -> access list searched
    - If allowed, capability created and attached to process
      - Additional accesses need not be checked
    - After last access, capability destroyed
    - Consider file system with ACLs per file





### **Access Control**

- Protection can be applied to non-file resources
- Oracle Solaris 10 provides rolebased access control (RBAC) to implement least privilege
  - **Privilege** is right to execute system call or use an option within a system call
  - Can be assigned to processes
  - Users assigned *roles* granting access to privileges and programs
    - Enable role via password to gain its privileges
  - Similar to access matrix







### **Revocation of Access Rights**

- Various options to remove the access right of a domain to an object
  - Immediate vs. delayed
  - Selective vs. general
  - Partial vs. total
  - Temporary vs. permanent
- Access List Delete access rights from access list
  - Simple search access list and remove entry
  - Immediate, general or selective, total or partial, permanent or temporary





- Capability List Scheme required to locate capability in the system before capability can be revoked
  - Reacquisition periodic delete, with require and denial if revoked
  - Back-pointers set of pointers from each object to all capabilities of that object (Multics)
  - Indirection capability points to global table entry which points to object – delete entry from global table, not selective (CAL)
  - Keys unique bits associated with capability, generated when capability created
    - Master key associated with object, key matches master key for access
    - Revocation create new master key
    - Policy decision of who can create and modify keys object owner or others?



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### **Capability-Based Systems**

- Hydra
  - Fixed set of access rights known to and interpreted by the system
    - i.e. read, write, or execute each memory segment
    - User can declare other auxiliary rights and register those with protection system
    - Accessing process must hold capability and know name of operation
    - Rights amplification allowed by trustworthy procedures for a specific type
  - Interpretation of user-defined rights performed solely by user's program; system provides access protection for use of these rights
  - Operations on objects defined procedurally procedures are objects accessed indirectly by capabilities
  - Solves the problem of mutually suspicious subsystems
  - Includes library of prewritten security routines





- Cambridge CAP System
  - Simpler but powerful
  - Data capability provides standard read, write, execute of individual storage segments associated with object – implemented in microcode
  - **Software capability** -interpretation left to the subsystem, through its protected procedures
    - Only has access to its own subsystem
    - Programmers must learn principles and techniques of protection





- Specification of protection in a programming language allows the high-level description of policies for the allocation and use of resources
- Language implementation can provide software for protection enforcement when automatic hardwaresupported checking is unavailable
- Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on whatever protection system is provided by the hardware and the operating system





- Protection is handled by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
- A class is assigned a protection domain when it is loaded by the JVM
- The protection domain indicates what operations the class can (and cannot) perform
- If a library method is invoked that performs a privileged operation, the stack is inspected to ensure the operation can be performed by the library
- Generally, Java's load-time and run-time checks enforce type safety
- Classes effectively encapsulate and protect data and methods from other classes





### **Stack Inspection**

protection domain:	untrusted applet	URL loader	networking
socket permission:	none	*.lucent.com:80, connect	any
class:	gui: get(url); open(addr);	get(URL u): doPrivileged { open('proxy.lucent.com:80'); } <request from="" proxy="" u=""></request>	open(Addr a):  checkPermission (a, connect); connect (a); 



# **End of Chapter 14**

